In comparing across policy instruments, economists commonly calculate weighted averages of the nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) or consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) for various products associated with different policy instruments. 1 However, aggregates of NRAs and CTEs for different instruments, even when weighted appropriately using production and consumption at undistorted prices as weights, are not able to capture very accurately the relative contribution of those different instruments to trade and welfare reductions. This is especially so when some policies (such as import or export taxes) have negative effects on trade while other policies (such as export subsidies) have positive trade effects. Likewise, if the importcompeting and exportables sub-sectors are each subject to trade taxes, sectoral average NRAs and CTEs may be close to zero even though both sub-sectors' policies are trade-and welfare-reducing. Furthermore, the welfare effect of a policy instrument is related to the square of the individual ad valorem distortion rate, which 1 The OECD (2010) measures similar indicators to the NRA and CTE, called producer and consumer subsidy equivalents, or more recently support estimates (PSEs and CSEs). The main difference, apart from the CSE having the opposite sign to the CTE, is that the NRA and CTE are expressed as a percentage divergence from undistorted (e.g., border) prices whereas the PSEs/CSEs relate to the divergence from actual (distorted) prices. it is calibrated to a series of past years rather than to just one or a small number of particular years.
Changing contributions of different agricultural policy instruments to global reductions in trade and welfare
The relative contributions of different policy instruments to reductions in trade and welfare are of interest to (a) trade negotiators as a way of prioritizing their negotiating efforts, and (b) agricultural policy analysts as a way of pointing to the inefficiencies in national government choices of policy measures. This has been the subject of particular interest during the Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, especially the relative importance of high-income country agricultural subsidies versus import market access restrictions (Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 2006) . Recent changes in trade restrictions in response to international food price spikes and harvest failures also have re-awakened an interest in policy instrument choice.
In comparing across policy instruments, economists commonly calculate weighted averages of the nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) or consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) for various products associated with different policy instruments. 1 However, aggregates of NRAs and CTEs for different instruments, even when weighted appropriately using production and consumption at undistorted prices as weights, are not able to capture very accurately the relative contribution of those different instruments to trade and welfare reductions. This is especially so when some policies (such as import or export taxes) have negative effects on trade while other policies (such as export subsidies) have positive trade effects. Likewise, if the importcompeting and exportables sub-sectors are each subject to trade taxes, sectoral average NRAs and CTEs may be close to zero even though both sub-sectors' policies are trade-and welfare-reducing. Furthermore, the welfare effect of a policy instrument is related to the square of the individual ad valorem distortion rate, which 1 The OECD (2010) measures similar indicators to the NRA and CTE, called producer and consumer subsidy equivalents, or more recently support estimates (PSEs and CSEs). The main difference, apart from the CSE having the opposite sign to the CTE, is that the NRA and CTE are expressed as a percentage divergence from undistorted (e.g., border) prices whereas the PSEs/CSEs relate to the divergence from actual (distorted) prices. means averages of the NRA (or CTE) fail to capture the fact that widely different rates of intervention across commodities within a policy instrument group have worse welfare effects than if all commodities had similar NRAs and CTEs.
Certainly sectoral partial equilibrium or economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) models can be and are used to estimate trade and welfare effects of different policy instruments, drawing on available estimates of NRAs and CTEs by instrument. However, such models are intensive in their needs for data and parameter (e.g. price elasticity) estimates. As well, typically they are calibrated to just one past year, and so are not well suited to timely on-going monitoring or historical analysis of policy developments. For example, Diao, Somwara and Roe (2001) and Hertel and Keeney (2006) draw on the GTAP database for 1995 and 2001, respectively. The GTAP database, which is updated every three years but typically with a long delay, 2 recognizes the 'three pillars' in the WTO agricultural negotiations (import tariffs, export subsidies and domestic production subsidies) but it tends to ignore export taxes, import subsidies, production taxes and consumption taxes and subsidies. While it is calibrated to a series of past years rather than to just one or a small number of particular years.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief summary of the theory for deriving the ITRI and IWRI (details of which appear in the algebra of the Appendix). This is followed by a description of the World Bank's Distortions to Agricultural Incentives dataset and its breakdown of the NRA and CTE estimates by instrument. The core of the paper is in the following section which presents and 3 These indexes can also be used to show annual fluctuations around trend in the contributions of different policy instruments, such as when international commodity prices spike (NRAs for which are examined in Anderson and Nelgen 2010 the volume of imports would have been af whereas in the presence of these three distortionary policy instruments it is reduced to cd. The welfare loss associated with these distortions is the sum of the triangles acn and dfm in Figure 1 . 5 The trade reduction is proportional to the extent to which the domestic prices exceed the border price, whereas each triangular welfare loss is proportional to the square of the domestic to border price wedge. 6 The latter is because the tariff rate determines both the price adjustment and the quantity response to this adjustment (Harberger 1959 ).
5 Consistent with our partial equilibrium formulation, we ignore throughout the possibility of welfare effects associated with having to alter other taxes or spending to accommodate changes in government revenue that would be associated with imposing/removing agricultural policies. 6 Throughout we assume that the trade status of a product in any year has not been altered by the interventions in that year; but the trade status of a product can and does vary through time in the distortions database.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
That figure could also be used to depict an import subsidy, a consumer subsidy and/or a producer tax. A similar figure could be drawn for an exporting industry, showing an export tax or subsidy with domestic consumer or producer subsidies or taxes. All eight instruments are considered below, unlike at the WTO where agricultural trade negotiators focus almost exclusively on just three instruments (import taxes plus production and export subsidies).
In a country with many tradable agricultural industries, each industry is likely to have a different ad valorem rate of policy distortion. The ITRI is a measure of the uniform ad valorem trade tax distortion for an individual policy instrument which, if applied to all commodities with that policy instrument distortion instead of actual distortions, would result in the same reduction in the aggregate volume of trade (value at that year's border prices) in those industries' products as the actual distortion structure. The IWRI is a measure of the uniform ad valorem trade tax distortion for an individual policy instrument which, if applied to all commodities with that policy instrument distortion instead of actual distortions, would result in the same reduction in economic welfare as the actual distortion structure.
The algebra needed to operationalize the ITRI and IWRI concepts is presented in the Appendix. It is developed assuming that a border measure is first implemented, and that it may be supplemented by additional domestic measures.
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The analysis is undertaken first for import-competing products and then for exportable products, in each case estimating indexes separately for producers and consumers and aggregating only in the last step. Accordingly, the four key equations for the import-competing sub-sector are the ITRI for border and domestic measures (B j and D j , respectively -see equations (6) and (8) of the Appendix) and the IWRI for border and domestic measures (WB j and WD j , respectively -see equations (14) and (15)).
The ITRI for a policy instrument is computed by weighting the distortions in all industries with that policy instrument. The weights are proportional to each product's domestic consumption (or production) response to changes in prices either from free-trade to a border distortion (B j and WB j ) or from a border-only distortion to a border-plus-domestic distortion (D j and WD j ).
In the Appendix it is shown that the weights for the ITRI and IWRI can each be written as functions of, among other things, the domestic price elasticities of demand and supply. With elasticity data available, it is possible to estimate indices that allow for the differential responses of different products when faced with the same ad valorem rate of policy distortion. However, even in the absence of elasticity data, it is possible, with the use of a simplifying assumption, to estimate indices using as weights the shares of each commodity's domestic value of consumption or production at undistorted prices. The assumption required is that the domestic price elasticities of supply are equal across farm products for a particular country, and likewise that a country's domestic price elasticities of demand are equal across products. Given the paucity of reliable estimates of domestic demand and supply elasticities for the many countries and products and years for which NRA and CTE estimates are now available, this is a very convenient assumption. It also turns out to be reasonably benign in practice, according to the sensitivity analysis reported in a complementary study by Croser, Lloyd and Anderson (2010) . The range of measures included in those NRA and CTE estimates is wide.
By calculating domestic-to-border price ratios, the overall estimates include the price effects of all tariff and non-tariff trade measures (positive or negative), plus any domestic price measures (positive or negative), plus an adjustment for the output-price equivalent of direct interventions in farm input markets. Where multiple exchange rates operate, estimates of the import or export tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well. The database is especially well suited to the analysis in this paper because it separately identifies each of the price effects of the different policy instruments referred to above.
The most aggregated summaries of NRA estimates for covered products for developing and high-income focus countries, averaged using weights based on the gross value of production at undistorted prices, are provided in Figure 2 . The Figure   supports the widely held view that developing country governments had in place agricultural policies that effectively taxed their farmers through to the 1980s, and that the extent of those disincentives has lessened since then. Indeed since the mid1990s those farmers have enjoyed slightly positive assistance on average. The figure also shows the growth of agricultural protection in high-income countries since the 1960s and its reversal on average after the 1980s (see details in Table 1 ).
Consumers have experienced changes similar to producers in recent years (hence a graph is not included): in developing countries consumers were effectively subsidized for most of the last 50 years although that has lessened since the 1990s, while in high-income countries the implicit taxation of consumers from agricultural border measures rose until the late 1980s but has fallen since then.
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 Assistance to import-competing farmers is typically well above that for producers of exports (Table 1) , and conversely for consumers of farm products. This means there is an anti-trade bias in the structure of agricultural distortions. In the case of developing countries where the import-competing NRA is positive and the NRA for exportables is negative, the two tend to offset each other such that the overall sectoral NRA is close to zero. Such a sectoral average can thus be misleading as an indication of the extent of distortion within the sector. It can also be misleading when comparing across countries that have varying degrees of dispersion in their NRAs for different farm industries.
Of most relevance for this paper is the instrument level NRA and CTE data. [Insert Table 2 about here]
The Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database also includes measures of so-called decoupled support and other non-product-specific assistance. Because decoupled payments and non-product-specific supports are not reported at the product level in the database, they are not captured in the ITRI and IWRI estimates. However, they are important for the overall story of agricultural policy -especially in highincome countries where there has been a move to forms of support decoupled from production in recent decades -and so an attempt is made in the Caveat section below to gauge the potential contribution of these measures.
Estimates of the instrument indexes
The results from estimation of ITRIs and IWRIs are summarized in Table 3 for the main regions of the world. The first thing to notice is that border measures dominate in terms of the trade-and welfare-reducing effects of agricultural policies in all regions being studied (hence the inclusion in that table of just the production side estimates, since the consumption side ones are similar -see Croser and Anderson 2010). This comes partly from the dominance of border measures in the NRA/CTE estimates, but also from the fact that a border measure affects both sides of the market whereas a domestic measure affects only one side (production or consumption).
[Insert Table 3 about here] Within border measures, import taxes are the most significant reducer of global trade, followed by export taxes which were especially prominent in developing countries through to the 1980s (Figure 3) . The other two categories of border measures (export and import subsidies) expand trade, but the ITRI estimates for these instruments are at such low levels that they have little offsetting impact on the trade-reducing effects of the trade-taxing border measures.
[Insert Figure Table 3 ). Import taxes contribute most to the reduction in global welfare due to border measures, followed by developing countries' export taxes (Figure 4 ). For the developing country group, export taxes were the most significant contributor to welfare losses prior to the 1990s, but their relative importance has fallen in all regions since then.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
A comparison of the ITRI and IWRI results in Table 3 with the NRAs in Table   2 reveals the usefulness of the index methodology. In the NRA aggregates, the two most-distorting policy instruments (export and import taxes) more or less offset each other, while for the ITRI and IWRI they are reinforcing. Notice also that import taxes in 2000-04 account for slightly more than 100 percent of border measure NRAs globally, but those taxes account for around only three-quarters of the global IWRI.
The global border measure WRI peaked for the world in 1985-89, after which it nearly halved to just over 30 percent by 2000-04. Table 4 reveals the relative contributions of each of the four border measures to this overall reduction, for each of the studied regions and globally. Import and export taxes contribute just over and a little under half of the overall global reduction, respectively. For developing countries, however, the fall was driven overwhelmingly by falls in export taxes: they account for 86 percent of their WRI reduction. This dramatic result receives no comment in the previous studies cited at the start of this paper, not only because they include no time series but also because they ignore export taxes (as well as production taxes and import subsidies).
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[Insert Table 4 about here]
Finally, annual time series reveal what happens to the relative contributions of different policies when international prices for farm products spike up or down.
Insulation of domestic markets from such shocks, by varying border trade restrictions, is a common practice in both developing and high-income countries (Anderson and Nelgen 2010) . The net effect is clear in Table 5 for the TRI, for example: when international prices spike up, as in 1973-74, the contribution of import tariffs falls dramatically but the contribution of export taxes rises, and conversely when international prices collapse, as in 1986.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Caveats
A number of important caveats are worth mentioning. Perhaps the most important caveat has to do with the simplifying assumptions about elasticities. For lack of a comprehensive set of country-and commodity-specific own-price elasticity estimates, it is assumed above that the own-price elasticity of supply (and also of demand) within a country is the same for each farm product. The effect of this assumption on the ITRI and IWRI estimates is likely to be small because those indexes draw on the instrument production and consumption distortion indexes which each have three terms (e.g., for the IPDI they are the production-weighted average price distortion, its variance, and its covariance with the output price elasticity of supply) and the elasticity appears only in the third term. We also ignore cross-price effects, as the algebra becomes far more complex without that assumption. And in the aggregation of country producer and consumer distortion indexes, we assume the aggregate marginal response of domestic demand to a price change is the same as the aggregate marginal response of domestic supply. To explore this last assumption we altered the weights on consumption and production (the a and b terms in the ITRI and IWRI formulae, respectively); we found this left the estimates for the border ITRI and IWRI almost unchanged at the aggregate level for all countries. This is not surprising given the high correlation between the IPDI and ICDI for border distortions.
Another caveat is that the TRI and WRI do not include forms of support that are not given at the product level. In the Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) database, non-product-specific (NPS) assistance in some countries is a significant component of overall agricultural sector distortion rate (see Table 2 ). NPS assistance is reported there in three forms: general non-product-specific assistance, those farm input subsidies for high-income countries that are not attributed at the product level in the database, and so-called decoupled payments. 
= p i *2 (dx ij /dp ij t ij ) − p i *2 (dy ij /dp ij )t ij where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied in country j, x ij and y ij , are assumed to be functions of own domestic price alone: and respectively. The neglect of cross-price effects, among other things, makes the analysis partial equilibrium.
The B subscript is used to denote border measures. The border expressions in this section can always be simplified since t ij is the same on the production and consumption sides of the economy. However, throughout this Appendix production and consumption are kept separate to allow for domestic production or consumption distortions and because the data are available in that form.
Strictly speaking, this result holds only for small distortions. In reality, rates of distortion to agricultural markets are not small. If, however, it is assumed that the demand and supply functions are linear, the reduction in imports is given by Equation (1) with and equal to constants. If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss. ij ij dp dx / ij ij dp dy / Now consider the same import-competing good to be subject also to domestic distortions to producer and consumer prices. For the producers of the good, the overall distorted domestic producer price in each country, , is given by =
(1 + (s ij + t ij )) where s ij is the rate of domestic producer distortion in proportional terms (here, relative to the border price). For the consumers of the good, the distorted domestic consumer price, , is given by
where r ij is the rate of the domestic consumer distortion in proportional terms. If r ij = s ij = 0, then = = p ij . In general, r ij ≠ s ij ≠ 0. An example, with linear demand and supply curves of this situation, is depicted in Figure 1 .
With both border and domestic distortions, the change in imports in the market for good i in country j, , is given by:
The change in imports from domestic measures alone, 
⋅ (dy ij /dp ij P )⋅ s ij
With n import-competing products each subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate reduction in imports for country j, in the absence of cross- 12 The D subscript is used to a denote domestic measures, to distinguish it from the T subscript which is used to denote total (i.e. border plus domestic) measures.
price effects, from border and domestic measures separately, can be found by summing Equations (1) and (3) across products, respectively:
Setting the result of those summations equal to the reduction in imports from a uniform border measure (B j ) and a uniform domestic measure (D j ) gives:
where is the price at the intersection of import demand and export supply where domestic distortions (additional to border distortions) are taken into account. 
and where the i subscript used in equation (6) refers to that subset of products with a border policy instrument.
B j is computed as a weighted average of producer and consumer distortions (Equation 6a
). R Bj and S Bj are indices of average consumer and producer border distortions, each arithmetic means. Since B j is an index of border measures, the distortions being aggregated on both the producer and consumer side are t ij values.
The weights for each commodity to compute R Bj and S Bj , u Bij and v Bij, , are proportional to each country's marginal response of domestic production or consumption to changes in international trade prices. Each of the weights in (6b) and (6c) can be written as functions of, among other things, the domestic price elasticities at either the protected trade situation, or the free trade situation:
where and are elasticities of demand and supply, respectively, at the protected trade situation when border measures are in place. When elasticities of demand (or supply) are constant across goods for a particular policy instrument, the weights in equation (7) collapse to share weights. We estimate our indices using weights at the protected trade situation because data are available only at that point.
For domestic policy instruments, the analogous ITRI expressions are given by:
and where the i subscript used in equation (8) refers to that subset of products with a domestic policy instrument.
The index D j gives the reduction in trade associated with a move from border support to border plus domestic support. Analysis of these equations is analogous to that for B j. The weight u Dij (or v Dij ) is proportional to each product's response to domestic consumption (or production) to changes in prices from a border-only distortion to a border-plus-domestic distortion. These weights differ from those in Equation (6) because they are computed at different prices. Once again, however, the weights can be written as functions of domestic price elasticities.
Consider now the derivation of the IWRI, which captures the overall effect of an individual policy instrument across many commodities on a country's economic welfare. The derivation follows the same steps as the derivation of the ITRI. It is assumed that a border measure is first implemented, and this may be supplemented by additional domestic protection. 13 The border measure distortion in the market for good i in country j creates a welfare loss, L Bij . In partial equilibrium terms, this loss is given by the sum of the change in producer plus consumer surplus net of the tariff revenue. The loss of producer and consumer surplus is given by:
where the demand for and the supply of good i in country j are again functions of own domestic price alone.
Again, this result holds only for small distortions. If, however, it is assumed that the demand and supply functions are linear, the welfare loss is given by (9) with and equal to constants, in which case welfare losses are defined by the familiar triangular-shaped dead-weight loss areas under the demand and supply curves for the good in a small open economy. If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss. ij ij dp dx / ij ij dp dy / Equation (9) yields the fundamental result that the loss from a tariff is proportional to the square of the tariff rate. This holds because the tariff rate determines both the price adjustment and the quantity response to this adjustment (Harberger 1959) .
With domestic distortions also in place, the welfare loss of producer and consumer surplus is given by:
2 (dy ij / dp ij P ) − ( p i * (t ij + r ij )) 2 (dx ij / dp ij C )
{ }
Assuming that domestic measures are imposed as a supplement to border measures, the welfare loss from domestic producer and consumer measures is given by the difference between Equations (10) and (9). 14 Algebraically:
The aggregate welfare loss for a country from the separate border and domestic measures, in the assumed absence of cross-price effects, can be found by summing Equations (9) and (11) across all import-competing products, which gives the left-hand side of Equations (12) and (13) dp dm WB p dp dx t p dp dy t p
Solving for the IWRI border measure (WB j ) first gives an expression in a similar form to Equation (6): 14 In the example depicted in Figure 1 , this is the sum of the two quadrangles bgnc and dmje. WB j is the uniform tariff that gives the same deadweight loss as that of the actual border distortions in country j. It is an appropriately weighted average of the level of distortions of consumer and producer prices from border measures. It is a mean of order two, which is critically different from the ITRI in Equation (6). As with the ITRI, the index is constructed by working with the production and consumption sides of the economy separately, and aggregating the production and consumption indexes in the last step.
The IWRI for domestic measures, WD j , is given by a more complex expression owing to the need to find the difference in welfare between all measures and border measures. As such the expression has four terms, instead of the usual two:
Each of the ITRI and IWRI measures can be written also for exportable products. For an exportable good, a positive price distortion (such as an export subsidy) reduces welfare in the same way as a positive import-competing distortion (such as an import tax), but the positive price distortion for an exportable increases trade whereas a positive import-competing price distortion reduces trade. That is why it is necessary to keep separate track of import-competing and exporting products for the purpose of estimating ITRIs and IWRIs.
The ITRI for border measures for exportable products is the same as that for Equation (6) As in the previous section, when estimating indexes for exporting products, they are estimated separately for producers and consumers and aggregated only in the last step. The aggregates in Equation (16) are the weighted average levels of distortions to consumer and producer prices for exportable products, respectively, with weights u Bij and v Bij given in Equation (6b) and (6c). Importantly, distortions to exportable products enter Equation (16) as negative values. This is because whilst a lowering of t ij in the import-competing sub-sector reduces the reduction index, a lowering of t ij in the exporting sub-sector increases it.
The ITRI measure B j computed in this way can be regarded as the country j export tax which, if applied uniformly across all products, would give the same reduction in trade as the combination of individual border measures distorting consumer and producer prices in the exporting sub-sector.
The ITRI for domestic measures, and the IWRI for border and domestic measures separately, can each be adapted to the exportables sub-sector from the import-competing sub-sector expressions in an analogous way, and the exporting instrument indexes have the same properties as the indexes for the importcompeting instruments. 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995- 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 Import tax Export subsidy Export tax
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Source: Authors' calculations using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) . pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those years were the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69 , and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively . This NRA assumption is conservative in the sense that for both countries the average NRA was probably even lower in earlier years. Source: Authors' compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) .
a In the absence of data, it is assumed the share of input tax/subsidy, domestic production tax/subsidy and border tax/subsidy payments for noncovered farm products are the same as those for covered farm products. The first period begins in 1981 because that was the first year for which estimates for China are available. b All entries have been generated by dividing the producer subsidy equivalent of all (including NPS and 'decoupled') measures by the total agricultural sector's gross production valued at undistorted prices. Source: Authors' compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) .
a. Contributions are computed using the value of the IWRI in constant 2000 $US billions. Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2010) 
